The Rafale deal controversy reaffirmed a crucial fact: A regional power with global ambitions but without an indigenous military industry would be crippled even during small crises.
If India wants to be a power worth reckoning, it must stand on its own two feet.
Besides a homegrown military industry, it must possess power projection capability. And the economy must grow at a minimum of 10 per cent to support such self-reliance.
Need for advanced technology ::
India’s armed forces urgently require advanced technology in weapon systems and other equipment but they are not yet available off-the-shelf and what is available is always second best. In fact, critical components are either inadequate or come at a very high cost.
As sellers of such technology keep their own geopolitical interests and constraints at the forefront before making any deal, the Army will face the threat of its supplies being stopped during emergencies.
Note that India’s neighbours are not only collaborating but also reverse engineering latest technologies, especially stealth, missiles and air defence. If India has to survive in this potentially combative environment, it must be well-prepared. Else, the peril is not far away.
DRDO and industry dilemma ::
The abysmal track record of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is not a big secret and it has been derailed by research, manufacture and sale woes.
Since the Indian defence industry is at a nascent stage at best, private players are invariably dependent on advances from the government. So, industrialists remain unwilling to invest in research and/or manufacturing unless the government provides guarantee that product will be purchased from them. Even the banking sector is reluctant to provide loans to new industries and start-ups in this sector.
In such a milieu, the armed forces are thrown into the same old rigmarole and forced to purchase weapon systems and equipment from foreign suppliers.
Cutting the flab ::
Voices across defence think tanks suggest the armed forces urgently require trimming but they provide no reasoning except pointing to the economics of maintaining such a large force. No research is done or actual finances worked out. Obviously, the intelligentsia is writing without due thought and following a single direction.
But the fact remains that the forces can’t afford to reduce manpower at their whims and fancies, especially when they do not have the main advantage of technology.
The process of ‘cutting the flab’ being projected can’t be done overnight as the reduction of intake by cutting recruitment is time-consuming and should not be hastened.
This hasty reduction may affect the forces adversely in the long run, generate dissatisfaction and impose a larger burden on the unemployment crisis.
Comparison with China ::
Comparison with China is always pitched forward, claiming that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has shed over 3,00,000 men. That certainly is a fallacious argument to begin with.
Imagine the morale of the force and the country with a sudden drastic increase of so many unemployed people. How can anyone believe two Army size formations (PLARF and PLASSF) are being created by shedding 3,00,000 highly trained personnel?
The PLA has also opened the doors for foreign deployments and plans to steamroller ships like dumplings: it added thirty-two ships in 2018 alone. PLAAF has raised the new J-20 stealth regiment, the Y-20 transport regiment and new fighter regiments are joining the force on a regular basis.
Therefore, the PLA losing personnel is one story we must take with a pinch of salt.
Shifting of ARTRAC ::
The ridiculous idea of shifting the ARTRAC was mooted for want of training grounds and brings us to several questions:
Does a command headquarter require training ground? How was the ARTRAC working until now? Was any case for such a training ground taken up? Did no one pay any attention to these issues since they were raised 28 years ago in 1991, first in Mhow and later moved in Shimla, in 1993? Did it move without any planning? Those planning the entire army’s training couldn’t plan their own move and training?
Relocating 62 Cantonments ::
The ‘Tughalaki Farman’ to relocate 62 cantonments in prime areas was issued in May 2018, calling it a necessary radical reform. It would involve selling off the property and using the money thus generated for purchase of equipment and weapons for the armed forces.
Someone should first work out the costs of establishing new, modern cantonments along the cost, designing and construction with continuous monitoring, and not to forget transfer. It would simply be unviable.
A thought also should be given as to where the 62 cantonments will be located and how they will survive between the time of vacating the cantonments for sale and construction of new ones, which will not be completed in less than a decade.
We must be glad that the thought of relocating the entire capital, since most of it is colonial vestige, has not yet crossed the writer’s mind.
Disastrous implications ::
Many a serving veteran states that such preposterous ideas are generated by ISI masterminds. Some say that if the nation doesn’t require the armed forces then disband the entire force and hire mercenaries on as required basis.
Both assumptions would be as wrong and unjustified as the thoughts they wish to ignore.
However, India must not be in a hurry to implement such decisions. A thorough study of every aspect with experts in the field should be carried out. For failing to prepare is preparing to fail!
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